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contract. Third, Krilich was bound by the stipulated facts used in
forming the decree, specifically the stipulation that the wetlands then
at issue were "waters of the United States." Finally, the court held that
the motion was not timely. Each of these four failures was adequate on
its own for the court to deny Krilich's motion to vacate the decree.
Krilich next argued for modification of the decree pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) (5). This rule provides that a
judgment may be modified or vacated if "a priorjudgment upon which
it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application."
The court held that this provision was not applicable here. The
provision was limited only to judgments that were the basis of issue or
claim preclusion, and not to cases relied upon as precedent.
Furthermore, the law had not been so changed by Solid Waste that
equity demanded the opening of the decree; Krilich's motion was
therefore denied.
Erika Delaney-Lew
Mississippi River Revival, Inc. v. Cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul,
MN, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1062 (D. Minn. 2001) (holding a violation of the
Clean Water Act would compel no further action and do nothing to
redress injuries given the improbability of future violations, and a
statutory bar against recovering retroactive penalties in citizen suits).
In an effort to improve the natural environment of the Mississippi
River, a group of environmental organizations ("Organizations"), sued
the cities of St. Paul and Minneapolis ("Cities"). The Organizations
alleged the Cities' discharge of storm water without a permit violated
the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). The Cities owned storm drains, which
dated back to the nineteenth century and could not be shut off. The
drains prevented surface water from building up by directing rain and
melted snow through a series of channels into the Mississippi River.
Along the way, the water picked up pollutants such as lawn fertilizer,
petroleum byproducts, animal waste, and garbage, which in turn
impaired aesthetic and recreational interests on the Mississippi.
In order to comply with the CWA, the Cities needed a National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit for their
discharges. The Cities submitted timely applications to the Minnesota
Pollution Control Agency ("MPCA") for their NPDES permits in
November 1992. Despite federal regulations requiring action on such
application within one year, the MPCA did not take action for several
years. While the applications languished, the Organizations filed suit
against the Cities for discharging without a permit. The Organizations
sought both declaratory and injunctive relief along with the assessment
of civil penalties and an award of attorney's fees. However, before
judgment on that case, the MPCA issued the Cities NPDES permits
and, thus, rendered the Organizations' claim for injunctive relief
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moot.

Nevertheless, the Organizations sought civil penalties against the
Cities for past violations of the CWA. The Minnesota District Court
then faced the question of whether citizens could rightfully file suit for
such retroactive civil penalties as well as whether assessing penalties
retroactively could possibly redress the Organizations' injuries or
prevent further violations of the CWA.
The court first considered whether civil penalties could redress the
Organizations' injuries or deter future violations. A request for civil
penalties becomes moot if the court can no longer grant relief that will
redress the injury claimed. Because the CWA makes all civil penalties
assessed pursuant to citizen suits payable to the United States Treasury,
assessing penalties would not result in awards to the Organizations.
Therefore, the court held, such penalties did nothing to redress their
injuries. Furthermore, the assessment of civil penalties is warranted
only when they "encourage defendants to discontinue current
violations and deter them from committing future ones." Here, the
court held since the Cities had permits, they did not continue to
violate the CWA.
Next, the court considered the power to sue for retroactive
penalties. It held such power fell outside the purview of citizen suits
and, thus, belonged only to the government. Citizen suits, at most,
allowed for civil penalties only if commenced during ongoing
violations. Here, the eventual issuance of the NPDES permits stopped
the violations, thus barring the Organizations' right to sue for civil
penalties.
Lacking any proof that penalties would redress injuries or deter
violation, and lacking the power to bring a citizen suit for retroactive
penalties in the first place, the Organizations' claims failed and the
court accordingly dismissed the suit.
Dan Wennogle

United States v. Buday, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (D. Mont. 2001) (holding
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers did not overrule the Clean Water Act protections of
tributaries of navigable waters, and such protections were
constitutional).
On August 11, 1996, Mr. Buday dug ponds and created burns near
Fred Burr Creek in Granite County, Montana. Fred Burr Creek
flooded in the spring of 1997, destroying the bums, and draining the
ponds. This sent dirt and debris into the surrounding wetlands and
downstream into Flint Creek. Mr. Buday was indicted, and pled guilty
to violating the Clean Water Act ("CWA") by releasing pollutants into
navigable waters, including wetlands.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court limited the definition of

